Kickback Act Held Not to Apply to Labor Union Officials by Broden, Thomas F.




Kickback Act Held Not to Apply to Labor Union
Officials
Thomas F. Broden
Notre Dame Law School, thomas.f.broden.1@nd.edu
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship
Part of the Labor and Employment Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Publications at NDLScholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal Articles by
an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information, please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thomas F. Broden, Kickback Act Held Not to Apply to Labor Union Officials, 22 Notre Dame L. 135 (1946-1947).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/896
RECENT DECISIONS
KICKBACK ACT HELD NOT To APPLY To LABOR UNION OFFICIALS.-
United States v. Carbone et al., 66 S. Ct. 734, 61 F. Supp. 882 (1946).
-This case raises an important question as to the meaning and scope
of Sec. 1 of the Act of June 13, 1934, commonly known as the Kick-
back Act, making it unlawful to prevent any person employed in
government construction and repair from receiving the full compensa-
tion to which he is entitled.
This case was originally adjudicated in the First District Court of
the United States and the following facts were found: the defendants,
four labor union officials, were indicted for conspiring to violate Sec.
1 of the Kickback Act. It was found that two contractors were en-
gaged in the construction of various public buildings for the United
States at Fort Devens, Mass. on a cost plus fixed fee contract. The
defendants, by virtue of their positions as local labor union officials,
made an agreement with the contractors by virtue of which the con-
tractors agreed to hire as laborers on the job only individuals who
were approved by the defendants and to discharge any of those em-
ployed at the request of the defendants. The defendants approved
for hire only those individuals who were members of the union or who
agreed to join the union. These laborers, once hired, understood that
discharge would result if either their labor union initiation fee was not
paid, or, for members, if their dues became delinquent. These fees
were also understood to be paid out of the salary that each laborer
received for his work.
Non-members met the requirement of joining the union by paying
their initiation fee with five dollar weekly installments. By presenting
the weekly receipts, signifying his full payment of the initiation fee,
the laborer was recorded by the union officials as a member. However,
some laborers did not remain on the job long enough to pay their full
initiation fee by this installment plan, consequently they were never
recorded as members. The amount which they did pay toward their
initiation fee was never accounted for by the defendants. As a result
of this the United States brought this criminal action against the de-
fendants on the grounds that they induced the laborers to give up
part of the compensation to which they were entitled and pilfered
transient laborers' fragmentary initiation payments.
The defendants made a motion to dismiss on the grounds that the
indictment did not state an offense cognizable in law. They claimed
that the Kickback Act was not violated by this method of collection
of initiation fees from prospective union members. In this view the
District Court agreed, holding the view that the facts as alleged in the
indictment fell outside the scope of the Kickback Act, the history or
purpose of which did not include these defendants in its scope.
This holding was affirmed by the Supreme Court of the United
States by a vote of five to three and the opinion of the majority as
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delivered by Mr. Justice Murphy emphasized the fact that the language
of the Act must be read in the light of the evils giving rise to the
statute and the aims its proponents sought to achieve. The Kickback
Act which reads "whoever shall induce any person employed in the con-
struction . .. of any . .. work, financed in whole or in part by loans
or grants from the United States, . .. to give up any part of the com-
pensation to which he is entitled under this contract of employment, by
force, intimidation, threat of procuring dismissal from such employ-
ment, or by any other manner whatsoever, shall be fined . . . or im-
prisoned ... or both" grew out of an investigation which revealed that
wages of American labor were being filched by contractors through a
system whereby laborers were paid the prevailing rate of wages but
were forced, upon threat of discharge, to pay to the contractors a cer-
tain percentage of the pay they lawfully earned. Thus on a govern-
ment project, where the United States set the wages of the laborer,
the kickback would render the contractor an unlawful profit at the ex-
pense of the laborer and taxpayer. The purpose of the Act, then, was
to insure that workers on federal projects would receive the full amount
of the stipulated wage. Viewed in this light, the Court pointed out,
it is apparent that the statute was not instituted to affect every persor
that fell in the sweep of its literal construction. And since the closed
shop is a lawful union practice, this method of obtaining such a shop
should not subject one to criminal prosecution.
It has been shown that the collection of initiation fees under the
threat of discharge is ordinarily the method of attaining a lawful closed
shop. However the indictment was directed at those cases where the
fee was but partly collected and the funds that were received remained
unaccounted for. Embezzlement and failure to obey union rules re-
garding the mishandling of initiation fees are vastly different from an
unlawful demand upon an employee to return part of the wages he
has earned. Subsequent wrongs do not render a previous lawful act
unlawful, nor do the subsequent wrongs characterize said acts as kick-
backs.
This opinion and decision were a complete departure from previous
holdings of other federal courts which had prosecuted union officials
under similar facts on the basis of the Kickback Act.
Thomas Broden.
REJECTION OF RADIO SCRIPT MUST BE REASONABLE.-Rose v.
Brown et al., Supreme Court, Monroe County, 58 N. Y. S. (2d) 654
(1945).-Action by Angelo A. Rose, against Gordon P. Brown, doing
business as WSAY Radio Station, and others, for a mandatory in-
junction to compel the defendant to broadcast two fifteen minute politi-
cal broadcasts in compliance with a contract.
